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Abstract. While deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks, considerably few efforts have been paid
to construct robust deep tracking algorithms against adversarial attacks.
Current studies on adversarial attack and defense mainly reside in a sin-
gle image. In this work, we first attempt to generate adversarial examples
on top of video sequences to improve the tracking robustness against ad-
versarial attacks. To this end, we take temporal motion into consideration
when generating lightweight perturbations over the estimated tracking
results frame-by-frame. On one hand, we add the temporal perturba-
tions into the original video sequences as adversarial examples to greatly
degrade the tracking performance. On the other hand, we sequentially
estimate the perturbations from input sequences and learn to eliminate
their effect for performance restoration. We apply the proposed adver-
sarial attack and defense approaches to state-of-the-art deep tracking al-
gorithms. Extensive evaluations on the benchmark datasets demonstrate
that our defense method not only eliminates the large performance drops
caused by adversarial attacks, but also achieves additional performance
gains when deep trackers are not under adversarial attacks. The source
code is available at https://github.com/joshuajss/RTAA.
Keywords: Visual Tracking, Adversarial Attack
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the success of CNNs for numerous computer vi-
sion tasks. Along with the success, the problem of attacking CNN models using
adversarial examples emerges recently. That is, small perturbations on input
images can lead the pretrained CNN models to complete failures. A number of
adversarial attack methods inject perturbations into input images to degrade
the performance of CNNs on a wide range of vision tasks, such as image classi-
fication [35], object detection [42], semantic segmentation [41], and face recog-
nition [6]. In view of the vulnerability of CNNs, the defense approaches [33,43]
aim to improve the robustness of CNNs against adversarial attacks. Despite the
significant progress, current studies on adversarial attack and defense mainly
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Fig. 1. Adversarial attack and defense for visual tracking. On top of the two state-
of-the-art deep trackers DaSiamRPN [46] and RT-MDNet [13], we learn to generate
adversarial examples to attack and defend them on the David3 sequence [40].
rest in static images. Considerably less attention has been paid to generating
adversarial examples on top of video sequences for robust deep tracking, where
motion consistency between frames involves more challenges.
In this work, we start by investigating the vulnerability of the state-of-the-art
deep trackers [27,18], which pose object tracking as a sequential detection prob-
lem to distinguish between the target and background. The CNN classifiers are
often updated online with positive and negative examples, which are collected ac-
cording to the previously estimated tracking results. In our investigation, we do
not modify existing deep trackers and keep their sampling schemes unchanged.
For adversarial attack, we learn perturbations and inject them into input frames,
yielding indistinguishable binary samples (i.e., a portion of the samples are in-
correct). We use these binary adversarial examples to retrain CNN classifiers
to degrade their performance. Specifically, we minimize the classification loss
difference between the correct and incorrect binary samples. When taking the
temporal consistency between frames into consideration, we use the learned per-
turbations in the current frame to initialize the perturbation learning in the next
frame. Applying the temporally generated perturbations for every frame further
degrades the performance of deep trackers. In addition to the CNN classifiers,
existing deep trackers widely use a regression network to refine bounding boxes.
We first attempt to randomly shift and rescale ground truth boxes to attack the
regression network. Note that attacking the bounding box locations significantly
differs from existing adversarial attack approaches on object detection [42], where
perturbations are generated via considering mis-classifications. Fig. 1 shows such
an example that the state-of-the-art deep trackers under adversarial attacks drift
rapidly (see the first row).
We step further to improve the robustness of deep trackers against adversar-
ial attacks. Note that the adversarial perturbations are assumed to be unknown
at this moment. Our motivation is to estimate the unknown perturbations in
the input videos and learn to eliminate their effects during tracking. The esti-
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mation process is similar to the attack but the involved samples are different.
As an example shown in Fig. 1, we perform the proposed adversarial attack
and defense approaches on two state-of-the-art deep tracking methods [46,13].
Extensive evaluations on large-scale benchmark datasets indicate the proposed
defense approach is effective in improving the tracking robustness against adver-
sarial attacks. When the trackers are not under adversarial attacks, the proposed
defense scheme helps to achieve additional performance gains. This is because
our defense is able to estimate the naturally existing adversarial perturbations
during the image formation process.
The main contributions of this work are summerized as follows:
– We propose to generate adversarial examples to investigate the robustness of
existing deep tracking algorithms. We inject dense adversarial perturbations
into input video sequences in the spatiotemporal domain to degrade the
tracking accuracy.
– We propose to defend deep trackers against adversarial attacks. We estimate
the adversarial perturbations and eliminate their effect to alleviate perfor-
mance drops caused by the adversarial attack.
– We perform adversarial attack and defense on state-of-the-art deep trackers.
The extensive evaluations on the benchmark datasets demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of both attack and defense. Our defense can further advance the
state-of-the-art deep trackers not under adversarial attacks.
2 Related Works
2.1 Deep Visual Tracking
Existing object tracking approaches can be generally categorized as one-stage
regression based methods and two-stage detection based methods. Deep learn-
ing advances both categories of tracking methods significantly. The regression
based methods typically learn correlation filters over CNN features to locate
target objects as in [23]. Since that, numerous methods are proposed to improve
tracking performance in different aspects, including feature hedging [29], con-
tinuous convolution [5], particle filter integration [44], efficient convolution [4],
spatiotemporal regularization [19], and roi pooling [34]. Meanwhile, there are
end-to-end learnable regression networks aiming to directly predict response
maps [37,11,36,31,21,38] for localizing the target object.
On the other hand, two-stage tracking-by-detection approaches first gen-
erate multiple object proposals and then classify each as either the target or
the background. The representative deep tracking-by-detection methods include
multi-domain learning [27,13], ensemble learning [10], adversarial learning [32],
reciprocative learning [28] and overlap maximization [3]. Recently, Siamese track-
ers [18,46,17,45,2,1,22] are prevalent because of their efficiency in online infer-
ence. The main difference between the Siamese trackers and other tracking-by-
detection methods is that Siamese trackers typically do not online update CNN
models while other methods do. In this work, we deploy the proposed adver-
sarial attack and defense schemes on two representative state-of-the-art trackers
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including one Siamese tracker [46] without online update and one detector based
tracker [27] with online update. Our goal is to illustrate the general effectiveness
of adversarial attack and defense on representative deep trackers with or without
online update.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks and Defense
Recent studies [8,35] have shown that CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples. Despite the favorable performance on natural input images, the pretrained
CNNs perform poorly given intentionally generated adversarial examples. Ex-
isting adversarial attack methods mainly fall into two categories: white-box and
black-box attacks. The CNN models are assumed to be known in white-box at-
tacks [8,25,24], whereas they are unknown in black-boxs attack [12,6]. In addition
to algorithmic attacks, physical attack methods generate real world objects to
lead CNNs models to misclassifications. These are typically useful to examine
the robustness of automotive driving in the road sign scenarios [16,7,39].
Defending CNNs against adversarial attacks can be regarded as robustly
learning CNNs with adversarial examples. Attempts have been made to for-
mulate defense as a denoising problem. From this perspective, the adversarial
examples produce noise on CNN features to distract the network inference pro-
cess. In [20,43], denoising algorithms are proposed to eliminate the effect of noise.
In addition, images are transformed to be non-differentiable in [9] to resist ad-
versarial attacks. Different from existing attack and defense methods, we attack
both the classification and regression modules of deep trackers to decrease accu-
racy. Then, we gradually estimate adversarial perturbations and eliminate their
effect on the input images without modifying existing deep trackers.
3 Proposed Algorithm
This section illustrates how to perform adversarial attack and defense for visual
tracking. Given an input video sequence and a labeled bounding box in the initial
frame, we generate adversarial examples spatiotemporally to decrease tracking
accuracy. On the other hand, our defense learns to estimate unknown adversarial
perturbations and eliminate their effect from input sequences. We deploy the
proposed attack and defense algorithms on the tracking-by-detection framework.
The details are presented in the following.
3.1 Adversarial Example Generation
We generate adversarial perturbations based on the input frame and the output
response of deep trackers, i.e., classification scores or regression maps. These
perturbations are then added to the input frame for adversarial example gen-
eration. In the tracking-by-detection framework, deep trackers usually take a
CNN architecture with two CNN branches. One branch classifies the sampled
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proposals to separate the target from background, while the other branch re-
gresses the bounding box axis for precise localization. A detailed illustration is
referred to [18]. We denote an input frame by I, the proposal number by N ,
the binary classification loss by Lc, the bounding box regression loss by Lr, the
correct classification label and regression label by pc and pr, respectively. Both
labels pc and pr are predicted by the tracking results S
t−1 from the last frame,
while S1 is the ground-truth annotation in the initial frame. The original loss
function of the tracking-by-detection network can be written as:
L(I,N, θ) =
N∑
n=1
[Lc(In, pc, θ) + λ · Lr(In, pr, θ)] (1)
where In is one proposal in the image, λ is a fixed weight parameter, and θ
denotes the CNN parameters to be optimized during the training process.
When generating adversarial perturbations, we expect CNNs to make inaccu-
rate inference. We create a pseudo classification label p?c and a pseudo regression
label p?r . The adversarial loss is set to make Lc and Lr the same when we use
correct and pseudo labels. The adversarial loss can be written as follows:
Ladv(I,N, θ) =
N∑
n=1
{[Lc(In, pc, θ)− Lc(In, p?c , θ)]
+ λ · [Lr(In, pr, θ)− Lr(In, p?r , θ)]}
(2)
where θ is fixed because the CNN is in the inference stage. The adversarial loss
Ladv reflects the loss similarity between using correct and pseudo labels. When
minimizing Ladv, the CNN predictions will be close to pseudo labels and the
performance will degrade rapidly.
We set pseudo labels specifically for each branch. In p?c , there are two ele-
ments (i.e., 0 and 1) which indicate the probabilities of the input belonging to
the target and background. We set p?c by reversing the elements of pc to con-
fuse the classification branch. On the other hand, pr consists of four elements
(xr,yr,wr,hr) representing the target location. We set p
?
r by adding a random
distance offset and a random scale variation to pr. Each element of p
?
r can be
written as:
x?r = xr + δoffset
y?r = yr + δoffset
w?r = wr ∗ δscale
h?r = hr ∗ δscale (3)
where δoffset and δscale indicate the random distance offset and random scale
variation, respectively.
After computing the adversarial loss in Eq. 2, we take taking partial deriva-
tives of the adversarial loss with respect to the input I. Formally, the partial
derivatives r is computed as:
r =
∂Ladv
∂I
. (4)
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Algorithm 1: Adversarial Example Generation
Input: input video V with T frames; target location S1;
Output: adversarial examples of T frames;
1 for t = 2 to T do
2 Get current frame It1;
3 if t 6= 2 then
4 Update It1 via Eq. 6;
5 end
6 for m = 1 to M do
7 Create pc and pr via IoU ratios between proposals and target
location St−1;
8 Create p?c by reversing elements of pc;
9 Create p?r via Eq. 3;
10 Generate adversarial loss via Eq. 2;
11 Update Itm via Eq. 5;
12 end
13 return ItM ;
14 end
We pass r into a sign function to reduce outlier effects. Given an input frame I,
we take M iterations to produce the final adversarial perturbations. The output
of the last iteration is added into the input frame, which can be written as
follows:
Im+1 = Im + α · sign(rm) (5)
where α = M is a constant weight,  is the maximum value of the perturbations,
m indicates the iteration index, Im is the input frame for the m-th iteration,
α · sign(rm) is the perturbations generated during the m-th iteration. The final
adversarial example is IM .
As video frames are temporally coherent, we consider the adversarial attacks
in the spatiotemporal domain. When there are T frames in an input video se-
quence, we use the learned perturbations in the last frame as initialization in
the current frame. Specifically, for the t-th frame, we use perturbations from the
last frame to initialize It, which can be written as:
It1 = I
t
1 + (I
t−1
M − It−11 ) (6)
where It−1M − It−11 is the perturbation from the last frame. Then we gradually
update It by using Eq. 5 to generate the final perturbations for the t-th frame.
The pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 1. Note that we use the IoU metric [30]
to assign proposal labels.
3.2 Adversarial Defense
We propose an adversarial defense method to recover tracking accuracy that are
deteriorated via adversarial attacks. Our motivation comes from the adversar-
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Algorithm 2: Adversarial Example Defense
Input: input video V with T adversarial examples; target location S1;
Output: adversarial examples of T frames;
1 for t = 2 to T do
2 Get current frame It1;
3 if t 6= 2 then
4 Update It1 via Eq. 8;
5 end
6 for m = 1 to M do
7 Create pc and pr via IoU ratios between proposals and target
location St−1;
8 Create p?c by reversing elements of pc;
9 Create p?r via Eq. 3;
10 Generate adversarial loss via Eq. 2;
11 Update Itm via Eq. 7;
12 end
13 return ItM ;
14 end
ial perturbations which are accumulated during the training iterations in each
frame. From Eq. 4, we observe that perturbations originate from partial deriva-
tives. Instead of adding perturbations to the input frame to decrease tracking
accuracy, we estimate the perturbations and subtract them from the input frame
gradually. As a result, the effect of perturbations will be eliminated to help CNNs
to make the correct inference. We defend adversarial examples without updating
CNNs.
Given an input frame I with unknown adversarial perturbations, we first
generate correct and pseudo labels according to the predicted location St−1 from
the previous frame. The label generation is the same as that in Sec. 3.1 except
that proposals are sampled randomly again. Then, we estimate the adversarial
loss by using Eq. 2 and compute the partial derivatives via Eq. 4. We apply
partial derivatives r on the input frame I via the following operation:
Im+1 = Im − Trunc
β·r∈[−αˆ,αˆ]
(β · r) (7)
where β is a constant weight, Trunc(·) is a truncation function to constrain the
values of β · r within the range between −αˆ and αˆ. The parameter αˆ resembles
the parameter α in Eq. 5. Since the perturbation is unknown during defense, we
empirically set different values for these two parameters. When the input videos
contain T frames, we still transfer the perturbations from the last frame to the
current frame as initialization. For the t-th frame, we update it initially as:
It1 = I
t
1 − γ · (It−11 − It−1M ) (8)
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Fig. 2. Variations of adversarial perturbations during attack and defense. The 3D re-
sponse map above the image represents the difference between the clean image and
the adversarial example at the current iteration. In adversarial attack, the perturba-
tions increase along with training iterations. In adversarial defense, the perturbations
decrease when training iteration increases.
where γ is a constant weight. The pseudo code of adversarial defense is shown
in Algorithm 2.
3.3 Deployment of Deep Trackers
From the perspective of online update, existing tracking-by-detection methods
involves two main stages. In the first stage, trackers do not update online while
utilizing an offline pretrained CNN model. In the second stage, trackers collect
samples online from previous frames to update the model. Note that trackers
with online update tend to improve model adaption by collecting samples in-
crementally, which may help defend adversarial perturbations. We deploy the
proposed adversarial attack and defense on two state-of-the-art trackers, DaSi-
amRPN [46] and RT-MDNet [13]. Details are presented in the following:
DaSiamRPN. There are two output branches in DaSiamRPN to classify and
regress proposals. During tracking, DaSiamRPN does not perform online update.
When processing each frame, we follow Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to generate
and defend adversarial examples, respectively. As the inputs contain a template
and search patch, we take partial derivatives with respect to the search patch
when computing Eq. 4 for both attack and defense.
RT-MDNet. The CNN model of RT-MDNet only performs classification. Dur-
ing tracking, RT-MDNet online updates its model by collecting samples from
previous frames. When processing each frame, we first generate adversarial ex-
amples and then perform prediction and model update. This configuration aims
to analyze whether online update is effective to defend adversarial examples. We
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Fig. 3. Ablation studies of DaSiamRPN on the OTB-2015 dataset [40]. We denote Cls
as the attack on the classification branch, Reg as the attack on the regression branch
where there are offset and scale attacks.
generate and defend adversarial examples using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2,
except that we remove the regression terms when computing Eq. 2.
Visualizations. We show how adversarial perturbations vary during different
training iterations in Fig. 2. DaSiamRPN is our baseline tracker to be attacked
and defended. Given an input frame, we visualize the perturbations during adver-
sarial attack. Along with the training iterations, the variation of perturbations
increases as well. The adversarial examples lead DaSiamRPN to drift rapidly.
When defending this adversarial example, we observe that the variation of the
perturbations decreases when training iteration increases. This indicates that
our defense method is effective to estimate and exclude the adversarial pertur-
bations, which helps to alleviate performance drops caused by adversarial attack.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the proposed attack and defense methods on bench-
mark datasets. We develop our methods on top of DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet
for all the experiments. The maximum variation value of each pixel in the per-
turbations is set to 10 (i.e.,  = 10) for attack and set to 5 for (i.e.,  = 5) defense,
respectively. When computing IoU ratios between proposals and the target lo-
cation St−1, we follow the threshold setting of DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet to
draw training samples. The parameters of deep trackers are kept fixed during
both adversarial attack and defense.
4.1 Ablation Studies
We analyze the effectiveness of each component of the proposed method. We
take the DaSiamRPN tracker as a baseline as it contains both the classification
and regression branches. We first evaluate the baseline performance on the OTB-
2015 dataset. Then, we separately apply our attack method on the classification
and regression branches. When we attack the regression branch, we analyze the
offset and scale variation effect. Meanwhile, we combine both classification and
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Fig. 4. Temporal consistency validation of DaSiamRPN on the OTB-2015 dataset [40].
regression attacks. Fig. 3 shows the evaluation results where the attack on the
regression branch degrades the performance more heavily than the attack on the
classification branch. Combining attacks on both branches lead to more degraded
tracking performance.
In addition to analyzing the attack in single frames, we show performance
degradation via temporally consistent attack. We transfer the perturbation of
the last frame to the current frame as initialization. Fig. 4 shows that our tempo-
rally consistent attack decreases tracking accuracies more than the static image
attack.
4.2 Benchmark Performance
We deploy the proposed attack and defense methods on DaSiamRPN and RT-
MDNet on four standard benchmark datasets (OTB2015 [40], VOT2016 [15],
VOT2018 [14] and UAV123 [26]). The results are presented as follows:
OTB-2015. There are 100 video sequences in this dataset with substantial
target variations. We apply the one-pass evaluation (OPE) with success and
precision plots. The precision metric evaluates the ratio of frames whose cen-
ter location error is within a certain threshold among all frames. The success
plot measures the IoU scores between the tracking results and ground truth at
different thresholds. The area under the curve (AUC) success scores are also
reported.
In order to evaluate our adversarial attack and defense methods, we first
show the results of the baseline trackers. Second, we attack the baseline trackers
by adding adversarial perturbations to input video sequences. In addition, we
show the attack performance by adding random perturbations containing the
same variations to those of adversarial perturbations. Fig. 5 shows that our at-
tack method reduces the AUC scores of DaSiamRPN from 0.655 to 0.050, and
the AUC scores of RT-MDnet from 0.643 to 0.131. The baseline trackers under
adversarial attacks perform much worse than that under random perturbations.
This indicates the effectiveness of our adversarial attack method on baseline
trackers. On the other hand, our defense method is able to suppress the max-
imal value of adversarial perturbations to restore the tracking performance. It
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Fig. 5. Tracking performance of the adversarial attack and defense methods on the
OTB-2015 dataset. We denote Att and Def as the adversarial attack and defense,
respectively, and denote Rand as random perturbations.
recovers the AUC score of DaSiamRPN to 0.721 and RT-MDNet to 0.653. This
demonstrates that our defense method can effectively remove the perturbations
to restore tracking performance. In addition, we apply our defense method on
original tracking sequences and improves AUC score from 0.880 to 0.886 for
DaSiamRPN and from 0.876 to 0.883 for RT-MDNet. This indicates that per-
turbations (e.g., noise) exist in real world scenarios during image formation pro-
cess (e.g., camera sensor noise, transformation from optical perception to digital
storage). Our defense method is effective to estimate these naturally existing
perturbations and eliminate their effects.
VOT-2018. There are 60 sequences on the VOT-2018 dataset. The VOT toolkit
will re-initialize the tracker if it loses the target object during 5 consecutive
frames. The evaluation metrics of VOT are expected average overlap (EAO), ac-
curacy (Acc) and robustness (Rob). The accuracy represents the average overlap
ratio and the robustness is measured by the number of re-initialization. EAO
measures the overall performance of trackers.
Table 1 and Table 2 show the experimental results of DaSiamRPN and RT-
MDnet. The failure number increases rapidly after attacking the original se-
quences. The EAO drops dramatically from 0.380 to 0.097 (i.e., a 74.5% de-
crease) for DaSiamRPN and from 0.176 to 0.076 (i.e., a 56.8% decrease) for
RT-MDNet. By integrating our adversarial defense method, the EAO scores of
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Table 1. Attack and defense on DaSiamRPN on VOT-2018 and VOT-2016 datasets.
VOT-2018 VOT-2016
Acc ↑ Rob ↓ EAO ↑ Acc ↑ Rob ↓ EAO ↑
DaSiamRPN 0.585 0.272 0.380 0.625 0.224 0.439
DaSiamRPN+RandAtt 0.571 0.529 0.223 0.606 0.303 0.336
DaSiamRPN+Att 0.536 1.447 0.097 0.521 1.613 0.078
DaSiamRPN+Att+Def 0.579 0.674 0.195 0.581 0.722 0.211
DaSiamRPN+Def 0.584 0.253 0.384 0.622 0.214 0.418
Table 2. Attack and defense on RT-MDNet on VOT-2018 and VOT-2016 datasets.
VOT-2018 VOT-2016
Acc ↑ Rob ↓ EAO ↑ Acc ↑ Rob ↓ EAO ↑
RT-MDNet 0.533 0.567 0.176 0.567 0.196 0.370
RT-MDNet+RandAtt 0.503 0.871 0.137 0.550 0.452 0.235
RT-MDNet+Att 0.475 1.611 0.076 0.469 0.928 0.128
RT-MDNet+Att+Def 0.515 1.021 0.110 0.531 0.494 0.225
RT-MDNet+Def 0.529 0.538 0.179 0.540 0.168 0.374
DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet are restored to 0.195 (a 51.3% increase) and 0.110
(a 62.5% increase), respectively. The performance decrease and restoration indi-
cate the effectiveness of our adversarial attack and defense method. In addition,
our defense method also improves the performance slightly when the baseline
trackers are not under adversarial attacks.
VOT-2016. The VOT-2016 dataset consists of 60 sequences. The evaluation
metrics are the same as those used in the VOT-2018 dataset. Tables 1 and
Tables 2 illustrate the performance of our attack and defense methods on DaSi-
amRPN and RT-MDNet. Our adversarial attack algorithm reduces the EAO
scores by 82.2% for DaSiamRPN and 65.4% for RT-MDNet. With the use of the
defense method on the adversarial examples, the accuracy of EAO is restored by
48.1% for DaSiamRPN and 60.8% for RT-MDNet. It indicates the effectiveness
of both adversarial attack and defense methods. In addition, when applying our
defense method to the attack-free trackers, the robustness gets largely improved.
Due to the reinitialization scheme in VOT, we observe that EAO and robustness
values decreased dramatically during attacks but accuracy value does not vary
much.
UAV123. The UAV123 dataset contains 123 sequences with more than 110K
frames, which are captured from low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. We
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Fig. 6. Results of the adversarial attack and defense methods on UAV123 dataset.
adopt the success and precision plots to evaluate the performance. Fig. 6 il-
lustrates the precision and success plots of DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet. Un-
der attacks, the AUC scores drop by 95.6% for DaSiamRPN and 84.6% for
RT-MDNet. The precision rate at 20 pixels is reduced by 94.3% and 83.0% for
DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet. The AUC scores are restored by 80.8% and 82.2%
respectively after defending the adversarial examples since the target objects on
the UAV123 dataset mostly undergo large shape changes.
4.3 Qualitative Evaluations
Fig. 7 qualitatively shows the tracking results of our adversarial attack and
defense methods for DaSiamPRN [46] and RT-MDNet [13] on 5 challenging
sequences. We visualize the attack and defense perturbations in (b) and (d). In
the original sequences shown in (a), both DaSiamRPN and RT-MDNet locate
the target objects and estimate the scale changes accurately. After injecting
adversarial perturbations in (b), DaSiamRPN fails to track the target and RT-
MDNet estimates the target scale inaccurately as shown in (c). The tracking
accuracy of RT-MDNet does not degrade severely compared to DaSiamRPN
because RT-MDNet only contains the classification branch while DaSiamRPN
contains both classification and regression branches. When we perform defense,
the adversarial perturbations are estimated and shown in (d). By subtracting
the estimated perturbations from the adversarial examples, DaSiamRPN and
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Fig. 7. Qualitative evaluation of adversarial attack and defense on video sequences.
RT-MDNet are able to locate target objects correctly in the video sequences
shown in (e).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose the adversarial attack and defense methods by generat-
ing lightweight perturbations within the deep tracking framework. When gener-
ating adversarial examples, we integrate the temporal perturbations into frames
by perplexing trackers with indistinguishable correct and incorrect inferences.
When defending adversarial examples, we suppress the maximum of adversarial
perturbation to restore the tracking accuracy. Extensive experiments on four
standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed methods perform favor-
ably both in adversarial attack and defense. In addition, our defense method is
capable of reducing interference from perturbations in the real world scenarios
to robustify deep trackers.
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